Editors' Summary by The Editors
Editors’Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL on Economic Activity held its sixty-eighth
conference in Washington, D.C., on September 2 and 3, 1999. This issue
of Brookings Papers on Economic Activity includes the papers, reports,
and discussions presented at that conference. The first paper uses a num-
ber of historical tax reforms to examine the response of taxable income to
tax rates and concludes, unlike some earlier studies, that the response is
small. The second paper asks whether today’s working households are
saving enough for retirement, by using a stochastic life-cycle model to sim-
ulate a distribution of wealth accumulation against which to compare actual
household savings. The third paper argues that Europe’s persistently high
unemployment primarily reflects a rise in the noninflationary unemploy-
ment rate caused by prolonged tight monetary policy, and develops a model
relating wage inflation to short- and long-term unemployment to explain
this hysteresis effect. The fourth paper reviews the nineteenth-century his-
tory of international financial crises for lessons about the need for finan-
cial reform, the advisability of ﬁnancial rescues, and the choice of exchange
rate regimes in today’s crisis-prone global economy. The issue concludes
with a report on the ﬁrst months of the European Monetary Union and on
how it has so far delivered on expectations.
FROM THE EARLIEST days of the federal income tax, critics have argued
that high marginal tax rates have damaging effects on incentives. “Supply-
side” arguments were prominent in the efforts to reduce the high surtax
that came out of World War I, and Andrew W. Mellon, who served as Pres-
ident Warren G. Harding’s secretary of the Treasury, stated clearly the
argument that six decades later, in the 1980s, was popularized as the Laf-
fer curve. At that time a prominent group of economists promoted the
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losses and may even be revenue reducing. 
The idea had lost momentum by the end of the 1980s, as econometric
studies failed to find much responsiveness of labor supply to tax rates.
But it was given new plausibility in the 1990s by a new literature that
argued that inelastic labor supply does not prove that deadweight losses
are low, or that the economy is on the side of the Laffer curve where higher
tax rates produce higher revenue. Most notably, analysis of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 suggested that cutting tax rates at the upper end of the income
distribution may substantially raise both revenue and welfare. In the first
article of this issue, Austan Goolsbee reexamines what he calls the New
Tax Responsiveness (NTR) literature and its analysis of the 1986 tax
reform, and applies its methodology to estimate the response to ﬁve earlier
large tax reductions.
The central premise of the NTR literature is that what matters for the
deadweight loss from taxation of labor income is not the elasticity of labor
supply but the elasticity of taxable income. If certain forms of income or
consumption, such as fringe benefits or nontaxed perquisites, are not tax-
able, high-income taxpayers may shift “income” to these nontaxed forms
without signiﬁcantly changing their labor supply. In NTR models it is such
switching that gives rise to deadweight losses from high taxation even
when labor supply is quite inelastic. Goolsbee provides a succinct sum-
mary of the NTR theory as it has been laid out by Martin Feldstein. Feld-
stein augments the standard static tax model, which considers only
consumption or income and leisure, by including nontaxable consump-
tion and nontaxable income as additional choice variables directly affect-
ing utility. In this setup the income tax is effectively a sales tax on taxable
consumption and does not directly affect the relative prices of the other
three “goods”: leisure, nontaxable consumption, and nontaxable income.
As long as the taxpayer is at an interior solution—that is, not already
choosing the maximum allowable amount of any of the untaxed alterna-
tives—the deadweight loss from an increase in the tax depends on how
much taxable consumption falls, and not on which of the nontaxable activ-
ities is increased. Motivated by this observation, the NTR literature has set
out to estimate the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the tax
rate, making use of the natural experiments generated by changes in the
progressivity of the income tax in the 1980s and 1990s. 
x Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
08032—BI/Editor's Summary  12/30/99 9:29 AM  Page xGoolsbee recognizes difficulties that various critics have raised about
using natural experiments to analyze the behavior of high-income indi-
viduals. However, his aim is not to add to that debate, but rather to apply
the methodology that others have used for 1986 to five other major tax
reforms between 1920 and 1975 in order to see what they suggest about
the magnitude of the taxable income elasticity. The advantages of using
these historical data are not only that they provide five additional natural
experiments, but also that some factors that may have biased the results
in the 1980s were different in the earlier periods. The main disadvantage is
that, except for some special surveys, panel data are not available, and
Goolsbee has to use statistical interpolations to calculate the relevant
incomes and tax rates.
The natural experiment approach to estimating tax elasticities requires
observing two groups of taxpayers who experienced tax changes of dif-
ferent magnitudes. To control for unobservables, the approach assumes
that the two groups’reported taxable incomes would have grown at iden-
tical rates were it not for changes in their relative taxation. With this
assumption, differing changes in taxable incomes can be attributed to the
different changes in tax rates. Hence the technique is often called the
method of “differences in differences.” Applying this methodology to the
1986 tax reform, Feldstein estimated an elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the after-tax share of income (one minus the tax rate) of more
than one. Goolsbee reports that a number of other studies of the 1980s
and 1990s that used a similar methodology produced a substantial range of
elasticity estimates. Critics have cited two important ﬂaws in these analy-
ses of the 1986 tax reform. That law expanded the tax base by eliminat-
ing many of the largest loopholes in the tax law. Thus taxable income
would have risen even if there had been no response to the lower rates
that were introduced at the same time. Also, the 1980s were a period of
steadily increasing income inequality for reasons presumably independent
of tax changes. Hence some of the relative increase in taxable income of
high-income households should be attributed to this underlying trend
rather than to the cuts in their relative tax rates.
Since marginal tax rates on high-income taxpayers were increased in
1993, while the secular trend in inequality continued, the difference-in-
differences estimates should have the opposite bias in that experiment.
Preliminary analysis by Feldstein and Daniel Feenberg of the change in
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but Goolsbee notes that this work does not distinguish between tempo-
rary and permanent changes in income. Higher-income individuals had
ample opportunity to realize income late in 1992 so as to avoid the higher
tax. Goolsbee’s own prior work showed that as much as 20 percent of the
decline in top-bracket income reported for 1993 came from just 10,000
corporate executives, driven almost exclusively by a one-time cash-out of
stock options in late 1992. Goolsbee found that the short-run elasticity in
this episode exceeded one, but that the elasticity after one year was one-
third or less. He reports that other studies also find lower elasticities in
the 1990s than in the 1980s, with sharply different implications for esti-
mates of deadweight loss. 
The ambiguities inherent in using any one tax reform to estimate elas-
ticities, and the differences between the results for the 1980s and the
1990s, suggest there could be great value in studying additional episodes.
One reason why econometric work has not been done on earlier periods
is lack of data. The only data available are the annual income histograms
published in the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income, which
reports the number of returns and total income for several tax rate brackets
but gives no individual-level tax data. This gives rise to several problems.
To interpret changes in the incomes of individuals in the top two income
brackets, for example, as indicative of the changes in earnings of individ-
uals in those brackets requires the assumption that there are no rank rever-
sals of individuals by income. Another difﬁculty is that income brackets in
these tables are fixed in nominal dollars over time. Even assuming that
there are no rank reversals, the number of individuals in each reporting
group changes over time, with growth in the number in the higher brackets
simply reflecting growth in incomes over time. Goolsbee has no way of
dealing with rank reversals. However, making use of the fact that the
Pareto distribution is known to fit the top of the income distribution quite
well, he devises a method of calculating the mean income of those tax-
payers in each of the top brackets who were in that bracket in the prior
year. This provides estimates of the income changes needed for the dif-
ference-in-differences estimation. He estimates changes in tax rates for the
various groups by increasing each group’s base-year income by the rate
of nominal GDP growth and applying the changed tax law. 
To provide a check on the reliability of this procedure, Goolsbee com-
pares the results of applying it to the 1986 reform with the results of the
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kinds of estimates. First, to parallel the results of Feldstein and Lawrence
Lindsey, he breaks the income distribution into three groups and calculates
the elasticities from the three pairwise comparisons. These estimates
reveal the sensitivity of the results to the income groups chosen: the elas-
ticities range from 2 to –0.2. Second, he produces regression estimates,
which he regards as more reliable, using eight income groups reported in
the Internal Revenue Service tables. For a range of values for the Pareto
parameters, he obtains elasticities near one. Goolsbee regards these results
utilizing histograms as reassuring, since they closely match those in the
existing NTR literature for the 1986 reform. 
Goolsbee then applies the same methodology to ﬁve major tax reforms
from the period 1920 to 1966, ignoring only the tax changes from World
War II. The episodes chosen include the tax cut of 1924–25; tax increases
in 1932, 1935, and 1950–51; and the tax cut of 1964. He brieﬂy describes
each of these episodes and their unique environments, noting features of
each episode that might bias the results one way or the other. Taken as a
whole, the regression results suggest that the elasticity of taxable income
is not nearly as large as others have estimated from the 1980s. The largest
elasticity is less than 0.6, and the average is much smaller. Results for the
1935 tax increase appear anomalous: estimated elasticities are negative,
which may result from increased enforcement of the tax law in that period
and from an increase in the corporate tax rate that may have led to income
shifting out of corporate form. Goolsbee also does a back-of-the-enve-
lope calculation of what the revenue-maximizing tax rate would be if there
were only one rate in the tax code. The estimates from the 1980s data
imply a revenue-maximizing rate of only 42 percent; the historical data
imply rates ranging from 63 percent to near 100 percent. 
Goolsbee buttresses these results from aggregate cross-sectional data
with analysis of two panel data sets on the incomes of corporate execu-
tives. The ﬁrst comes from the Forbes magazine survey of executive com-
pensation that began in 1970, just prior to the cuts in the top tax rate that
occurred in 1971 and 1972. The second, previously used by Charles Had-
lock and Gerald Lumer, includes data from the Survey of American Listed
Corporations for the years 1934–38. That survey was supervised by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to report compensation and bal-
ance sheet information for publicly traded firms. Goolsbee enumerates
some advantages and disadvantages of using these compensation data.
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income individuals, use income measures that are consistent over time,
and make it possible to control for characteristics of the firms employing
the executives. An important disadvantage is that the data provide no infor-
mation about deductions or other forms of income, including stock or
stock options. Goolsbee suggests this is less of a problem for these earlier
periods than it would be today, when options have become an important
element in executive compensation. He also notes that the tax cut in the
1970s was atypical, only lowering the marginal rate on earned income. 
Using these data, Goolsbee runs regressions which, by including indi-
vidual and year effects or GDP growth, are equivalent to the difference-
in-differences natural experiments. His regressions include both tax rates
and specific characteristics of firms and individuals. For both of the
episodes, separated by roughly thirty-five years, the estimated elasticities
of taxable income are low. The highest are roughly 0.25, and some esti-
mates for the 1970s tax changes are actually negative, as are three out of
four estimates for the 1930s tax change.
All in all, Goolsbee’s results suggest that the evidence from the 1980s
on which the NTR literature is based is atypical of historical experience.
The largest estimates of the elasticity from any of the previous historical
periods are lower than the smallest estimates based on the 1980s. His
results suggest that the results from the 1986 tax reform do indeed reﬂect
some of the biases that have been suggested, and he concludes that it is
implausible that cutting today’s marginal tax rates will raise revenue. 
THE LOW AND DECLINING national saving rate of the last decade, along
with a general consensus that demographic changes will eventually force
some combination of cuts in social security benefits or tax increases, has
stimulated research on whether households’provisions for retirement are
adequate. There is no clear consensus, but a number of economists have
concluded that they are not. In the second paper of this issue, Eric Engen,
William Gale, and Cori Uccello address this issue by comparing the wealth
accumulation implied by optimal behavior in a life-cycle model with
actual household saving information reported in two comprehensive sur-
veys of household behavior. 
One reason for the difference of opinion about the adequacy of house-
holds’saving for retirement is that adequacy can be defined in different
ways. Some mean by adequacy a level of saving sufﬁcient to maintain con-
xiv Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
08032—BI/Editor's Summary  12/30/99 9:29 AM  Page xivsumption during retirement at its preretirement level; others mean enough
to support living standards of future elderly at the levels enjoyed by the
current elderly; still others mean enough to keep the elderly out of poverty.
Although the authors acknowledge that each of these definitions is valid
for some purposes, their meaning of “adequate” is different. They regard
saving as adequate if observed saving and wealth accumulation are con-
sistent with the optimizing behavior of agents in a standard life-cycle
model. By this measure, if a household has little wealth relative to its
income as a result of inattention to the future or some other deviation
from optimal life-cycle behavior, its saving has been inadequate, whereas
if it has responded as best it could to unexpectedly low income in the past,
its saving is deﬁned to be adequate. 
Various researchers who have used life-cycle models to examine saving
behavior typically ask the question the other way around: whether the life-
cycle model can explain observed behavior, not whether observed behav-
ior is consistent with optimal life-cycle behavior. Posing the latter question
places an extra burden on Engen, Gale, and Uccello. They must specify
key parameters of the model on the basis of a priori beliefs and plausibil-
ity, without reference to whether they result in a good ﬁt. 
A second distinguishing feature of the authors’analysis is its empha-
sis on differences in the earnings experience of individual households.
Rather than asking whether the wealth-income ratio of a whole class of
households of a given age and educational status appears optimal, they ask
whether the distribution of wealth-income ratios of such households is
consistent with optimizing behavior, once it is recognized that individual
households experience idiosyncratic shocks to their incomes. Looking at
the entire distribution of outcomes recognizes the fact that even if every
household behaves optimally, households of the same age, education,
and current earnings are likely to find themselves in quite different cir-
cumstances, depending on their history. It also enables the authors to com-
pare the predictions of a model of optimizing behavior not just for the
average or the median household, but for households at various places in
the distribution. 
The authors’elaborate stochastic life-cycle model requires a number
of assumptions. Like other studies, theirs assumes that household lifetime
utility is the discounted sum of period-by-period utilities, where each
period’s utility is a constant relative risk-averse function of consumption,
with a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion of 3. 
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time preference, and the authors provide an extensive discussion of plau-
sible values. Lower rates of time preference lower optimal consumption
early in life and raise it later, thereby increasing the amount of wealth that
an optimizing household would accumulate by the eve of retirement. Since
the authors define saving adequacy by whether it matches optimal accu-
mulation, the choice of the time preference parameter signiﬁcantly affects
their conclusions about the adequacy of households’saving. The authors
recognize that using rates from empirical studies that explain actual house-
hold saving over time would beg the issue, since such studies typically
choose values that assume actual behavior is optimal. They also believe
that surveys that estimate the rate by asking households for their preferred
consumption profiles suffer from being purely hypothetical or involving
very small stakes. The authors end up choosing two values. One is a rate of
time preference of 3 percent, which they suggest is lower than the rate used
in most previous studies. The other is a rate of zero, which leads house-
holds to plan for very rapid consumption growth and, in the authors’view,
errs on the side of ﬁnding household saving to be inadequate. 
To get realistic estimates of the mean age-earnings profile, the authors
use 1980–92 data on earnings of employed heads of households and their
spouses from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics. Age-income pro-
files are estimated for groups with high (sixteen or more years) and low
(less than sixteen years) educational attainment. The estimates use a ﬁxed-
effects model with earnings as a function of age, age squared, and yearly
dummies to control for macroeconomic developments. Although the
macroeconomic effects are removed when estimating the profiles, the
authors assume that the wages of all age groups are expected to rise by 1
percent per year. Individuals are assumed to retire at age sixty-two. On
the basis of an earlier study by one of the authors, earnings shocks (in
logarithms) are specified as a first-order autoregressive process with a per-
sistence parameter of 0.85 and a variance of 0.05. Under this speciﬁcation,
about half of a shock to earnings remains after five years. Households
face a progressive tax structure, with marginal tax rates, deductions, and
exemptions similar to those prevailing in the United States in 1998. In
retirement each household receives social security and employer-pro-
vided pension benefits based on the average earnings profile of its educa-
tion class, not on its actual wage profile (in the simulations households
are distinguished by whether or not they have pensions). Although house-
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is closed by unexpected inheritances that households receive from the
estates of households that die. 
The timing and magnitude of wealth accumulation depend crucially on
a household’s life-cycle earnings profile, family formation, and life
expectancy. The authors’stylized household begins life with two adults,
both aged twenty-one, who have one child four years later and a second
three years after that. Children become financially independent at age
twenty-one and leave home. Adults in the household face uncertain life
spans. Annual survival probabilities, estimated from the 1994 life tables
used by the Social Security Administration, are near 1.0 until about age
ﬁfty but decline steadily thereafter and become quantitatively important as
the household ages further. By age sixty-five the annual survival rate for
males is down to 0.98, and by age eighty it is 0.92; both rates are slightly
higher for females. Life ends for certain in the model at age 110. 
The age profile of income and family size, and uncertainty about life
span and labor income—together with the terms on which households bor-
row and lend—are the central determinants of the household’s wealth
accumulation. If there were no uncertainties, and if households could bor-
row and lend at the same risk-free rate, optimal consumption per capita
would follow a smooth path. That path would be constant, growing, or
declining, depending on whether the interest rate was equal to, greater
than, or less than the pure rate of time preference, respectively. 
Two additional features of the model change the nature of the optimal
path. Households cannot insure against uncertainties in life span, earn-
ings, or inheritances, and are not allowed to borrow. As a consequence,
households save not only to try to smooth consumption per capita over the
life cycle but, early in their life, for precautionary motives as well. As a
result, in simulations of the model, optimal consumption per capita for the
median household follows a hump-shaped curve. Even when the interest
rate equals the rate of time preference, consumption is low when the
household is young and grows as wealth accumulates, reflecting the
decreasing need for precautionary balances. The importance of the accu-
mulation of precautionary balances early in the life cycle is evident in
the fact that wealth accumulation (relative to income) is essentially the
same for households with different future income prospects and with
widely differing rates of time preference. In the simulations, wealth accu-
mulation begins to diverge substantially for households with different
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by which time, for most households, the no-borrowing constraint is rela-
tively unimportant. For the next twenty years or so, consumption per
capita behaves much as it would in the absence of uncertainty and bor-
rowing constraints. It is relatively flat or slowly growing, depending on
the rate of time preference.
To sustain their optimal consumption during retirement, college-
educated households without pensions need much higher rates of wealth
accumulation than do non-college-educated households. Pensions, which
are scaled to preretirement income, moderate this difference. And given
smooth consumption per capita, the changes in family size with the arrival
and departure of children significantly shift total household consumption
and saving. With children present for twenty-four of the household’s first
thirty years, total household consumption is significantly higher during
this part of the life cycle than later. In the later years of life, increasing
mortality probability makes households less patient, leading them to con-
sume their wealth at a more rapid rate than if they had a constant mortal-
ity rate, and resulting in a declining consumption path.
The authors show that, even with a rate of time preference equal to
the risk-free interest rate, their model results in median wealth-earnings
ratios higher than the targets used by other authors. For example, the
median target for households in their sixties exceeds that calculated by
Douglas Bernheim and John Karl Scholz by amounts ranging from
45 percent for households without pensions to 12 percent for college-
educated households with pensions. These results confirm the authors’
view that their assumptions give a conservative basis on which to judge
the adequacy of saving. 
A distinctive feature of the analysis is its attention to the distributional
consequences of individual households’earnings experience. Optimizing
households that have identical age and family size, current earnings, life
expectancy, education, and pension status will have sharply different
wealth-earnings ratios as a consequence of past earnings surprises. For
example, for the population of sixty- to sixty-two-year-old college grad-
uates with pensions, optimal wealth-earnings ratios vary by a factor of
almost twenty, from 0.37 at the 5th percentile to 7.07 at the 95th. At a
zero rate of time preference, these ratios are higher but the range is
almost as wide. The authors stress that these differences are not due to
myopic or irrational or ill-informed behavior. Households in the model
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about precautionary saving, fully aware of the stochastic nature of their
future earnings. 
How does this simulated distribution of wealth-earnings ratios of opti-
mizing agents compare with the observed distribution of households with
the same observable characteristics? Weighting survey observations to rep-
resent the national population, the authors compute wealth-earnings ratios
for households in the 1992 Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and in the
1983, 1989, 1992, and 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). They
develop three measures of wealth: a broad measure that includes essen-
tially all net worth other than vehicles, an intermediate measure (which
they prefer) deﬁned as broad wealth less half of equity in the primary res-
idence, and a narrow measure that excludes all equity in the primary resi-
dence. All the wealth measures include balances in defined contribution
pension plans; in 401(k) plans, Individual Retirement Accounts, and
Keogh plans; and, in the HRS data, the value of defined benefit plans. In
the SCF such plans are treated, along with social security, as a ﬂow of ben-
efits during retirement. The authors therefore compare SCF data with the
results of the optimizing model for households with pensions.
The authors compare the distribution of wealth-earnings ratios gener-
ated by their optimizing model with the ratios in their samples for house-
holds of the same age, education, and pension status. For the authors’
preferred assumption regarding the rate of time preference (3 percent)
and the broad or the intermediate measure of wealth, they find that
between 52 and 60 percent of the HRS sample exceed the median target
wealth-earnings ratio. Reducing the time preference rate to zero lowers
these percentages substantially; nevertheless, 46 percent of the HRS sam-
ple still have broad wealth–earnings ratios that exceed the median, and
39 percent have intermediate wealth–earnings ratios that do so. They also
find that households with pensions and with more education appear to be
saving signiﬁcantly more relative to the simulations than other households. 
Several other features of the distributions are worth noting. For all ages
and wealth deﬁnitions and for both rates of time preference, the observed
wealth-earnings ratios in the HRS at the 95th percentile greatly exceed
the model’s estimates based on optimal behavior. The authors suggest
that this is not surprising given that bequest motives are absent from the
model yet may be important for the relatively wealthy, and because the
observed ratios at the upper end of the distribution may reflect high rates
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wealth-earnings ratios fall unambiguously below the simulated ratios for
the bottom 25 percent of households, and for the 5th percentile dramati-
cally so. The authors observe that although these results are consistent with
systematic undersaving, they could also be explained by the omission from
the model of a government-provided consumption ﬂoor. They note that the
results are significantly less optimistic if a zero rate of time preference is
assumed. In this case the data suggest that a significant portion of the
population is undersaving by substantial amounts. 
The authors use probit regressions to investigate the characteristics of
high and low savers (those with wealth-earnings ratios above or below
the simulated median, respectively, given a 3 percent time preference rate).
Most of the results seem sensible. For example, high savers have fewer
children than low savers and are more likely to have received an inheri-
tance, to be self-employed, to believe they will live to age seventy-ﬁve, to
have thought a lot about retirement, and to expect to retire earlier. The
probit regressions do, however, find an anomalous result for income:
for households nearing retirement, the likelihood of having a high
wealth–income ratio falls as income rises. The authors presume that this
reﬂects transitory income shocks that depress the ratio. However, it could
also be that most of the presumed variance in the ratio reﬂects inheritances
and capital gains that are not closely related to income.
The SCF data allow consideration of a number of additional items,
because this survey spans a wider age group and longer period of time
than the HRS. The characteristics of high and low savers are quite simi-
lar to those found with the HRS, but the observed wealth-earnings ratios
are generally higher relative to the simulation than those using the HRS.
The percentage of households that exceed the simulated median is some-
what larger, and the ratios are nearer the simulation results at the bottom
of the distribution. 
The authors recognize that, elaborate as it is, their model still abstracts
from a number of important features of the actual environment facing
households, and that the parameter values they have assumed, although
plausible, are still somewhat arbitrary. They discuss the sensitivity of their
analysis to alternative parameter values and to some extensions of the
model. Although changes to assumptions about risk aversion, interest
rates, and the persistence of earnings shocks have substantial effects on
optimal wealth accumulation, in most of their simulations close to half of
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Other changes they consider have larger effects. They quantify the conse-
quences of cutting social security benefits by 30 percent, of raising the
retirement age by three years, of anticipating inheritances, of increased
health care costs for retirees, and of increasing the expected life span by
10 percent. In many of these cases they find noticeable effects on simu-
lated wealth-earnings ratios. Taken singly or together, these alternatives
could qualitatively alter the impression of saving adequacy. The authors
also discuss the likely qualitative effects of a number of other factors. They
suggest that uncertainty about the rate of return on investments, about
retirement income, and about preretirement health care expenditure are
much less important than earnings uncertainty during the working years.
They also reason that the omission from their model of private and social
insurance, of private annuity markets, and of the possibility of partial or
delayed retirement all bias their results toward concluding that actual sav-
ing is below the simulated optimal values.
The authors’conclusion that the distribution of households’ wealth
accumulation is in rough accord with optimal behavior appears to contra-
dict the conclusions drawn by a number of previous authors using similar
methodologies. Yet the authors suggest that the results of many previous
studies may be consistent with the general tenor of their own findings.
They note that studies that find that a substantial fraction of households
have wealth below the mean or the median estimate of optimal wealth
should not be taken to imply that those households have behaved sub-
optimally, but rather that roughly half of the households have had below-
average earnings draws. They also observe that the way saving shortfalls
are reported may misstate the magnitude of the problem. Bernheim’s ﬁnd-
ing that baby boomers’retirement saving averages only about one-third
of that needed to maintain preretirement living standards calculates the
one-third on the shortfall between the total resources needed and those
provided by social security and pensions. For example, for a relatively low
income household with a pension, the combination of social security and
the pension might supply, say, 91 percent of what is required. A house-
hold whose saving covers “only” one-third of the shortfall would actually
have 94 percent of what it needs to maintain its living standard in retire-
ment. The authors are also critical of studies that compare households’pre-
retirement consumption with the consumption that would be allowed by
converting the households’wealth into a hypothetical annuity. And they
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retirement as evidence of undersaving, arguing that these declines may
well reﬂect reduced consumption needs. 
Although their results leave them more optimistic than many other
researchers about the adequacy of household saving, the authors caution
that some important uncertainties about the preferences of individuals
and about real-world contingencies point to difficulties for particular
groups. They note that their study does not include single workers or
unemployed couples, both of which are more at risk than married couples
who work full time. And they find worrisome reports that one-third of
households in their fifties appear not to have thought much about
retirement, and that approximately 20 percent of households, including
45 percent of black households and 37 percent of fifty-one- to sixty-one-
year-olds who have not graduated from high school, do not even have a
checking or a savings account. 
IN THE EARLY POSTWAR decades, the economies of Western Europe regu-
larly operated with unemployment rates well below those in the United
States. Today that position has dramatically reversed: Europe’s lead in
keeping unemployment low gradually narrowed during the 1960s and
1970s and was gone by the end of the 1980s. During that decade the United
States fully recovered from the deep recession associated with the second
OPEC price shock; by contrast, in most European economies unemploy-
ment was much higher at the end of the decade than it had been at the
start. In the 1990s the U.S. expansion has reduced unemployment to thirty-
year lows, while the experience of the European economies has been
mixed. In France, Germany, and Italy, which constitute the core of the
new European Monetary Union, unemployment rates at the end of the
decade are higher than they were at the worst point of the 1980s recessions. 
Because most analyses assume that monetary policies have only short-
term effects on real economic outcomes, attempts to understand this era
of historically high unemployment in Europe have focused on such
supply-side factors as safety net policies, labor market institutions, and
productivity trends. In the third paper of this issue, Laurence Ball builds on
the idea, first proposed by Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers,
that unemployment is subject to hysteresis, which could give rise to lasting
effects of monetary policies on employment levels. Indeed, Ball’s analysis
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high unemployment in many European economies.
Ball amends the familiar NAIRU framework by treating the value of the
NAIRU as endogenous in the medium run, rather than as a constant or only
slowly moving structural parameter of the economy. He ﬁrst examines how
policy responses affected the NAIRU in the six of the Group of Seven large
industrial countries that experienced recessions in the early 1980s:
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. He shows that the two North American countries pursued prompt
and aggressive countercyclical policies when their economies fell into
recession, whereas the four European countries did not. The North Amer-
ican central banks cut nominal interest rates sharply while their European
counterparts held them steady or even raised them, with the result that
real interest rates fell an average of 3.4 percentage points in North Amer-
ica and actually rose slightly in Europe. Ball supports this evidence on
the stance of policy with accounts of central bankers’policy deliberations
from the period.
Ball sees the immediate consequences of these differing responses to
recession in the strength of the recoveries that followed. He models the
canonical cyclical pattern as one in which easing monetary policy in a
recession produces an initially rapid recovery that brings the economy
back to near its long-run growth path fairly promptly. After the initial
recovery phase, expansions typically return to near trend growth rates. In
the North American countries, the quarters following monetary easings
followed this pattern. By contrast, France, Germany, and Italy had much
weaker expansions in their first two years of recovery. Since he relates
the strength of early expansions to the degree of previous monetary easing,
Ball identiﬁes monetary policy as the reason these three economies never
returned to their previous growth paths. Only the United Kingdom fails to
fit this pattern well: the initial pace of its recovery after 1984 was in
between those in North America and the other European economies, but
growth slowed in subsequent quarters before recovery was complete. Ten
years after their recession troughs, output in each of the four European
economies was still well below the level predicted by prerecession growth
trends. These patterns of output relative to trend produced corresponding
patterns of high unemployment relative to prerecession levels in each of
the economies. 
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of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
For this analysis he uses annual rather than quarterly data, since the latter
are unavailable for some countries. Although this causes some precision to
be lost in measuring recessions, the larger sample allows him both to
examine the role of monetary policy econometrically and to investigate the
role of unemployment insurance in the rise in European unemployment.
Ball makes use of the OECD’s estimates of time-varying country NAIRUs.
For each country, he calculates a “degree of hysteresis,” deﬁned as the ratio
of the change in the NAIRU over the five years since the previous cycli-
cal peak to the maximum rise in actual unemployment over that same
period. He then uses cross-country regression analysis to examine how the
change in the NAIRU and the degree of hysteresis, both measured over the
years following the early 1980s recessions, are related both to monetary
policy during the recessions and to the duration of unemployment beneﬁts.
He measures monetary easing or tightening by the largest change in real
interest rates in the ﬁrst year of a recession; beneﬁt duration is the measure
identiﬁed in earlier work as the most signiﬁcant labor market variable.
Ball’s cross-country regressions find statistically significant effects
from both variables. In the regression explaining hysteresis, the coefﬁcient
on monetary policy implies that reducing real interest rates by 6 percent-
age points, the largest decline in his sample, reduces the degree of hys-
teresis by 0.54. Since this measure can in principle range between 0 and
1.0, the estimated effect of an aggressive antirecessionary monetary policy
in preventing a rise in cyclical unemployment from becoming a rise in
the NAIRU is substantial. In the same regression, reducing the duration
of beneﬁts from indeﬁnite to half a year reduces the degree of hysteresis by
0.35, also a substantial effect. From a separate regression using the same
sample of seventeen countries, Ball reports that the response of monetary
policy to recession has no effect on the trend rate of inﬂation between the
cyclical peak and ﬁve years later.
The regressions that successfully explain the rise in NAIRUs follow-
ing the 1980s recessions do not explain the rise in NAIRUs following the
generally milder recessions of the early 1990s. The reason, Ball specu-
lates, may be that NAIRUs do not rise indefinitely and were already high
in many countries by the start of the decade, or that policies switched so
erratically in the early 1990s that measures of the degree of policy easing
are unreliable. 
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ment while others did not, and Ball examines whether monetary policies
and labor market reforms can explain this divergence. He focuses on ten
countries that had OECD NAIRUs above 8 percent in 1985, dividing them
into two groups according to whether they succeeded in reducing their
NAIRUs between then and 1997. Four of the countries—Ireland, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom—did reduce their
NAIRUs, whereas the other six did not. Ball ﬁrst considers whether labor
market reforms have been important in explaining this difference in per-
formance. Using the OECD Jobs Study, which provides time series on
labor market distortions, he finds that some measures, such as the strin-
gency of employment protection, do not change at all over the period,
and others change very little. None are correlated with failure or success in
reducing NAIRUs. Ball reports that two of the four successful economies
used incomes policies—the 1982 Dutch accord on wage restraint and Ire-
land’s 1988 national pay agreements—but that two of the six failures,
Spain and Italy, also did so. He also considers less quantitative anecdotal
evidence about reforms in particular countries but ﬁnds no consistent pat-
tern to the effects of reforms. 
To examine potential macroeconomic explanations, Ball relies mainly
on indirect evidence about demand-side shocks. Given that there were no
important adverse supply shocks in the late 1980s, he reasons that rising
inﬂation represents a demand expansion that pushes unemployment below
the current NAIRU. He hypothesizes that hysteresis during such periods
reduces the NAIRU just as it increased the NAIRU in periods when unem-
ployment stayed high. Ball shows that the three largest increases in infla-
tion occurred in three of the four economies that succeeded in reducing
their NAIRUs. When these countries subsequently slowed their inﬂations,
their NAIRUs stayed at their lower levels or continued declining. The
fourth successful economy, Ireland, does not ﬁt Ball’s explanation because
it experienced no initial large inflation runup. Nonetheless, a scatter dia-
gram comparing the experience with inflation and NAIRU changes in all
ten countries further supports the idea that strong demand expansion was
important in the success stories and that inadequate demand expansion
helps explain the failures.
Ball goes on to construct a formal model that explains hysteresis in
unemployment by distinguishing the impact of the short-term unemployed
from that of the long-term unemployed on wage inflation. The model
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unemployed have little effect on wages, and second, that ﬁrms prefer to ﬁll
vacancies from among the short-term unemployed because the long-term
unemployed require more costly retraining or are more costly to recruit.
Employment in the model is driven by demand. If a rise in unemploy-
ment is not met with expansionary policies sufficient to reverse it, some
workers become long-term unemployed, raising the NAIRU because their
unemployment no longer has an impact on wage setting. But unlike some
hysteresis models that see such unemployment as very hard to reverse, in
Ball’s model ﬁrms will incur the recruiting and retraining costs that come
with hiring the long-term unemployed once they cannot ﬁnd other workers
to ﬁll vacancies. As such workers are rehired, the NAIRU falls. A demand
expansion strong enough to create these conditions will also create some
inflation, but in Ball’s model that inflation can subsequently be elimi-
nated without undoing the improvement in the NAIRU. As an example of
recent experience that fits the broad predictions of his model, Ball points
to the United Kingdom. As unemployment there declined from 11.6 per-
cent in 1985 to 6.9 percent in 1997, the fall in long-term unemployment
accounted for 85 percent of the decline in total unemployment, and the
NAIRU fell from 9.5 percent to 7.2 percent. 
FINANCIAL CRISES ARE a recurring theme of economic history books.
Although the international financial landscape has evolved dramatically
over the past two hundred years, and institutions have changed in response
to past crises, in period after period significant new problems have
emerged. The generally prosperous 1990s have been no exception. The
breakdown of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992
was followed two years later by a run on the Mexican peso and the subse-
quent abandonment of that currency’s peg to the dollar. That was followed
in turn by the 1997 crisis that enveloped several East Asian countries and
by the 1998 crises in Brazil and Russia. The economic consequences of
these events have varied in severity. The ERM breakdown was readily con-
tained by ﬂoating the currencies that had come under pressure and adjust-
ing monetary policies. The other crises were followed by sharp downturns
in several economies and brought controversial financial support and
direction from the United States and the International Monetary Fund.
Even with the benefit of hindsight, there is still disagreement about what
caused all these crises, what should have been done at the time, and what
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issue, Bradford DeLong provides a historical perspective on these current
issues by reviewing crises of earlier eras.
The years immediately preceding World War I were a high point of
globalization. That period was followed by a quarter century of war and
depression, during which barriers to trade and capital flows were raised.
With the gradual removal of these restraints, and with the rise of multi-
national enterprises able to control and integrate production around the
world, the global integration of commerce has now surpassed its earlier
peak. However, DeLong sees international financial integration, by some
measures, as having been even greater in the past than it is today. He shows
that, in the pre–World War I period, flows of net international investment
from the United Kingdom had built up that country’s foreign holdings
relative to national income, to many times those of any country today. He
also shows that annual ﬂows of international investment ﬂuctuated widely
in the earlier period. Thus both their magnitude and their variability made
international ﬁnancial ﬂows a potential source of ﬁnancial instability. 
DeLong focuses mainly on the developing U.S. economy, which was a
major recipient of foreign investment in the nineteenth century. Crises of
varying severity emerged frequently—by some counts, the United States
averaged one crisis every eight years in the period after the Civil War.
Although he identiﬁes no common cause of these episodes, DeLong notes
a rough regularity in their aftermaths: foreign investment flows declined
after each crisis but generally resumed in force several years later. For
example, after many U.S. states defaulted on their debts in 1830, foreign
investors shied away from lending to any level of U.S. government for
about a decade, but then came back. Not long after the panic of 1857, for-
eign investment was important in financing the railroad boom of the late
1860s and early 1870s. And although corruption scandals and major bank-
ruptcies dried up capital inﬂows in 1873, they were again rising sharply by
the end of the decade. 
Turning to the 1990s, DeLong applies the lessons he derives from these
earlier episodes to the ongoing debate about the recent crises. He ﬁrst con-
siders the significance of what has been called crony capitalism and of
related forms of corruption, both as a cause of the recent crises in emerg-
ing economies and as an impediment to recovery from them. From a col-
orful recounting of past U.S. financial scandals, he concludes that crony
capitalism was as pervasive in the United States before World War I as it
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ing deadweight loss from misallocation of capital could have been large
both then and now. But from the fact that capital kept returning to U.S.
investments even without adequate ﬁnancial reforms, he infers that ﬁnan-
cial market reforms are not a precondition for resumption of large-scale
capital ﬂows today. That, in turn, is a mixed blessing. He observes that, if
reforms are not needed to attract foreign capital, governments of emerging
market economies will have little incentive to undertake them on their
own. Their incentive is further dulled by two facts. First, the systems that
have been so sharply criticized since the crises had supported historically
unprecedented rates of growth in East Asia for decades. And second, the
design, let alone the installation, of optimal financial systems for devel-
oping countries is no easy matter. 
DeLong next considers the role of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the rescue packages it provides. Rescue packages are tradi-
tionally advocated on the grounds that they provide time for needed
adjustments to be made when a crisis strikes, and that they provide the
resources that countries need to ride out irrational panics on the part of
lenders. But are they also a source of moral hazard, contributing to lend-
ing excesses and thus increasing the likelihood and severity of a crisis?
DeLong notes that there were international financial crises long before the
IMF came into being. But he notes that the moral hazard that results from
IMF rescues could increase the severity of such crises. DeLong poses the
question, “Why hesitate to lend to a banking system in trouble if one is
confident that the IMF will bail out the government, the government will
bail out the banking system, and the banking system will repay you ...?”
His own answer, based on historical comparisons, is ambiguous. He
reports that crises since 1972 have, on average, been associated with
somewhat sharper output declines than crises before 1914. On the other
hand, the most severe of the earlier crises had worse outcomes than any
from the recent period.
DeLong finally considers the core questions relating to exchange rate
regimes. In the half century before World War I, the classical gold standard
defined the relationships among the major currencies. Under this regime,
investors expected that the exchange rates of well-run countries would be
ﬁxed indeﬁnitely or would quickly return to their ﬁxed parities after a cri-
sis. In recent years, however, institutional arrangements have been vastly
different: a few major currencies float freely, with only rare interventions
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ety of currency pegs, bands, and dirty ﬂoats. DeLong observes that the via-
bility of the middle range of options within which most countries have
managed their currencies is now being questioned, and that the preferred
alternatives today center around two extremes: pure ﬂoating, or tying more
ﬁrmly to the dollar or one of the other major currencies.   
Under the gold standard, the original system for tying currencies ﬁrmly
together, a country’s monetary policy was dedicated to maintaining the
gold parity of the currency, or restoring it if the currency temporarily fell
below par in a crisis. With expectations fixed by this commitment, inter-
national capital flows would help stabilize a currency once the resolution
of a crisis was in sight. On the other hand, DeLong observes that doubt
about the government’s commitment becomes a potential source of dis-
order, as it did for the United States in the early 1890s. At that time,
foreigners feared the Populist movement might gain power and force a
depreciation. The high real interest rates required to keep the dollar at its
gold standard parity in the face of this perceived risk caused a severe and
prolonged depression. 
From this history, DeLong concludes that a strong and credible com-
mitment to a fixed exchange rate parity can convey substantial benefits.
But he sees problems in making such a commitment fully credible, par-
ticularly in the modern world. He notes that even the United Kingdom
under a conservative government could not keep foreign exchange traders
at bay in 1992 and that, earlier, the disastrous interwar experience of the
industrial countries showed the dangers of trying to maintain parities
come what may. In contrast to beliefs during the gold standard era, today
it is generally recognized that government policies have important short-
run effects on economic performance, and elections are decided by the
mass of voters who have a strong interest in prosperity and jobs—and
little financial interest in hard money. Thus, DeLong reasons, a govern-
ment’s claim that it will support a fixed parity regardless of the macro-
economic consequences cannot be made believable. And without the
ability to make such a commitment believable, a fixed parity is vulnera-
ble whenever it is stressed. Thus, on this question, as on those of how
corruption and the IMF’s role impinge on financial crises, DeLong’s his-
torical perspective enriches our understanding of recent events but does
not lead him to strong conclusions about how the international financial
system might be improved. 
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launched at the start of 1999, with the euro as its new currency, observers
have watched closely to see what changes it would bring to Europe’s eco-
nomic, financial, and business environment. EMU’s proponents had seen
monetary union as a historic step in the long endeavor to bring financial
stability and further economic integration to Europe’s economies.
Although it is far too early to evaluate the new monetary union’s perfor-
mance against this promise, some early returns are in. The new European
Central Bank (ECB) has already both lowered and raised interest rates, the
financial and nonfinancial business sectors have responded vigorously to
the opportunities provided by the new unified currency, and the value of
the euro has declined markedly against other currencies. In a report in
this issue, Giancarlo Corsetti and Paolo Pesenti provide a comprehensive
review of the early days of monetary union and offer their interpretation of
the major developments to date. 
The move to monetary union had suffered a setback in the currency
crisis of 1992. The crisis caused some countries to leave the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM), which had closely linked the exchange rates of
most of the currencies of the EU countries, and led to much wider
exchange rate bands linking the currencies of those that remained. At the
time, these developments cast doubt on whether full monetary union could
be achieved. However, from their current perspective, Corsetti and Pesenti
argue that, for those countries that remained in the ERM, the crisis
strengthened the commitment to the conditions and timetable for EMU
that had been laid out the year before in the Maastricht Treaty. By 1998
these conditions, which included convergence of inflation rates, interest
rates, and fiscal policies, as well as central banking reforms, were near
enough to being met to permit a seamless conversion to EMU at the start
of 1999.
Bond markets have historically been much less important for corpo-
rate finance in Europe than in the United States. The authors report that
bank loans are about three times the volume of bond financing for Euro-
pean corporations, just the inverse of the ratio for U.S. corporations. They
note that EMU was expected to make bonds more attractive for all issuers,
by removing currency risk and creating a broader and deeper pan-
European market. In line with these expectations, total bond issuance
surged from an average of $150 billion per quarter in 1998 to an average of
$240 billion in the first half of 1999. However, Corsetti and Pesenti offer
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pean corporate finance has already emerged. They note that bonds issued
by nonfinancial corporations in the first two quarters of 1999 were only a
small, although rising, portion of these totals. Moreover, much of the
growth in issuance has come from U.S. firms and from those European
firms that had traditionally financed with bonds. Some issuers had delayed
coming to market until after the launch of the euro. Part of the growth in
issuance has been driven by the current wave of mergers and acquisitions
rather than by conventional financing needs. And bond issuance in other
currencies also rose during this period, suggesting that part of the Euro-
pean surge might have occurred without EMU. The authors also discuss
the good start of the market for euro-denominated government bonds and
are optimistic about the development of a strong secondary bond market.
They also believe that the euro will promote cross-country diversifica-
tion of European equity portfolios, but they suggest this change will occur
only gradually.
The new European Central Bank has been the object of intense scrutiny
since it became responsible for stabilization policy at the start of the year.
Although maintaining price stability is clearly its principal mandate,
uncertainty still surrounds how the ECB will operate in practice. One set
of issues has to do with how it conducts its deliberations and communi-
cates them to the public. Another has to do with how it will interpret its
mandate to focus on price stability if economic conditions in individual
economies diverge or if the exchange rate of the euro moves markedly.
Corsetti and Pesenti observe that price stability is specified as a range of
0 to 2 percent, as measured by a European index of consumer prices that
excludes interest costs, and that it is identified as a medium-run target.
They note that both the range and the time horizon provide some leeway
for short-term variations in inflation, although the need to establish cred-
ibility is likely to keep the ECB from using this leeway in a permissive
direction any time soon. When, with signs that the major European
economies were slowing, the ECB reduced short-term interest rates by
50 basis points in the spring of 1999, it caught markets by surprise and
signaled that the bank would be responsive to prospects for output growth.
It also suggested that stabilizing the foreign exchange value of the euro,
which had fallen since the start of the year, was not in itself a factor in
its decisionmaking. In an addendum, the authors interpret the 50-basis-
point increase in rates in the fall as a response to improving prospects
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higher oil prices. 
On the broader questions about ECB conduct and targets, Corsetti and
Pesenti note that, taken together, the two large rate changes reveal an
activist bent at the new central bank. They also see some signiﬁcance in the
fact that, after surprising the markets the first time, the bank signaled its
intentions well before raising rates in the fall. This and other announce-
ments concerning the governing board’s deliberations may indicate that
the governors are sensitive to demands for greater transparency. The
actions taken thus far offer little clue about how the ECB will respond to
divergences in the economic performance of member countries, which
were apparent before the start of EMU and have continued since. 
The authors see the decline in the international value of the euro dur-
ing its first year as consistent with fluctuations in the “synthetic” euro—
the bundle of individual currencies that the euro has now replaced—in
the years before EMU. Hence they do not regard the euro’s decline as a
sign of weakness attributable to the euro itself. The authors see the ECB’s
willingness to cut interest rates in the spring, when the euro was falling,
as a clear sign that it attaches importance to cyclical stabilization. And they
find no basis for judging under what, if any, circumstances the exchange
rate could acquire a more prominent place in the ECB’s decisions. 
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